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1. Introduction 
 
The most conspicuous characteristics of Korea’s modern trade union 
movement and industrial relations are: 1) persistent development of 
enterprise-based unionism, which is not common in advanced and newly 
industrialized countries, 2) a militant labor movement, and 3) confrontational 
industrial relations, led mainly by large companies.  
These characteristics emerged as a by-product of the rapid process of 
industrialization during the last half century, and they are clearly 
distinguishable from the cooperative enterprise-based industrial relations of 
Japan, which went through a very similar industrialization process (Dore, 
1973; Cole, 1979). Enterprise-based trade unions in Japan have not always 
functioned cooperatively.  In fact, the unions have often acted in 
contradictory and ambivalent manner to protect their members’ interests 
when their interests are not in line with the companies’ interests. Yet, in 
general, they have actively cooperated with the management toward 
improving mutual gains (Shirai, 1983).  
Enterprise-based unions in Korea, compared with the generally 
cooperative behavior of Japanese trade unions, are highly pronounced in their 
confrontational stance, and such confrontational relations are often found in 
large companies.  What makes the story more puzzling is that large Korean 
companies have traditionally provided their employees with very stable 
employment and exceptional wage increases amid continuous revenue growth 
backed by their monopolistic market position and export growth. So, one may 
wonder why there exist such high level of conflicts between the 
managements and unions of large firms, 
  One of the reasons, especially in comparison with other countries, is that 
Korean labor movement has developed not just to protect the workers’ rights 
in industrial relations, but also to promote the social justice of the working 
class. This is similar to the situation in Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, and the 
Philippines, where the labor movement has come to be understood within the 
context of the whole society, not merely within the arena of labor-
management relations. It must be regarded as a civil movement, in contrast to 
the “business unionism” of the U.S. (Johnston, 2001).  
However, though the labor movement in Korea has rapidly expanded since 
1987 buttressed by the national democratic movement and has strengthened 
its militant characteristics in bargaining for wage increases, it has largely 
failed to become a major political force.  It is no exaggeration to say that the 
decade since 1987 has been almost exclusively spent on improving bargaining 
power at the enterprise level (Lee and Lee, 2004). This is where our 
attention is drawn.  We want to investigate the strategic factors used by 
trade unions of large companies since 1987 to ensure their bargaining power. 
Union movements grew explosively, boosted by the democratization 
movement that started in June 1987. The number of unit unions, numbering 
only 2,700 in June 1987, increased to 7,800 with 1.93 million members in just 
two years. However, since 1990, the membership continued to dwindle 
throughout the decade reaching just 1.14 million in 1998. There are two 
reasons behind the decline of membership. First, the union movement of small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs) has significantly weakened in the 1990s 
when the movement base has become seriously eroded due to business 
constraints that resulted in suspensions and shutdowns.  Secondly, the 
number of regular workers eligible for union membership greatly decreased 
(Lee, 2003). The number of union membership has recovered to around 1.26 
million in 2002, but large companies continued to lead the union movement.  
This is indicated by the fact that as of the end of 2001, the number of large-
scale unions with 500 or more union members was 417 or 6.8% of the total 
number of unions, while their members numbered 1.15 million or 73.5% of the 
total population of unionized workers.  
Thus, Korea has come to be known for its trade unions centered in large 
companies, its militant industrial relations, and its “world’s worst” title in 
terms of conflicts between labor and management, according to the ranking 
by the Institute for Management Development (IMD). In its 2003 Annual World 
Competitiveness Report, the IMD gave Korea’s industrial relations the 60th 
place, the lowest among 60 countries, after it was recorded as 43rd among 49 
countries in 1998, 46th in 1999, 44th in 2000, 46th in 2001, and 47th in 2002 
(See Table 1).  
 
<Table 1> International comparison of cooperative industrial relations  
Ranking COUNTRY   
1 Singapore 8.52 
2 Denmark 8.45 
 2 
3 Switzerland 8.29 
4 Austria 8.07 
5 Japan 7.92 
6 Iceland 7.92 
7 Zhejiang 7.89 
8 Malaysia 7.84 
9 Hong Kong 7.84 
10 Finland 7.82 
51 Philippines 5.47 
52 Ile-De-France 5.44 
53 Israel 5.42 
54 South Africa 5.42 
55 Argentina 5.36 
56 France 4.86 
57 Venezuela 4.84 
58 Poland 4.82 
59 Indonesia 4.68 
60 Korea 4.00 
Source: IMD World Competitiveness Report 2004.  
The IMD index, though based only on the assessments by businesses, 
undeniably shows that industrial relations in Korea are a very strong 
deterrent undermining the national competitiveness in the era of global 
economy. The main reason for the notoriety of the country’s confrontational 
industrial relations is found in its unusually high frequency of industrial 
disputes. The National Competitiveness Report by IPS, which compares the 
actual numbers of working days lost due to industrial disputes, shows that 
industrial disputes in Korea are at a comparatively higher level (See Table 2).  
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<Table 2> Labor dispute working days lost per 1,000 inhabitants  
RANK COUNTRY INDEX DAYS 
1 Singapore 100.00 0.00 
2 China 100.00 0.00 
3 Pakistan 100.00 0.00 
4 Brazil 100.00 0.01 
5 Venezuela 100.00 0.01 
6 Egypt 100.00 0.02 
7 Sweden 100.00 0.03 
8 Colombia 100.00 0.10 
9 Germany 99.99 0.13 
10 Hong Kong 99.99 0.14 
41 Sri Lanka 99.28 15.48 
42 Denmark 98.92 23.33 
43 Australia 98.88 24.20 
44 Romania 98.83 25.25 
45 Ireland 98.82 25.32 
46 Taiwan 98.31 36.41 
47 Korea 98.15 39.75 
48 Israel 97.85 46.32 
49 Finland 97.73 48.94 
50 Canada 97.51 53.55 
51 United States 96.66 71.91 
52 South Africa 95.88 88.65 
53 Spain 95.75 91.75 
54 Norway 94.89 10.988 
55 Argentina 92.17 168.50 
56 Nigeria   0.00 2152.30 
Source:  IPS National Competitiveness Report, 2004 
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<Table 3> compares yearly changes in OECD countries’ actual number of 
working days lost due to industrial disputes in recent years. Canada has the 
highest number of days lost to disputes,1) followed by Italy and Korea.  Japan 
and Germany, with similar industrial characteristics as Korea in terms of the 
proportion of manufacturing industries within the whole economy, have 
remarkably low levels of industrial disputes. The U.K. and the U.S., which are 
often characterized as having confrontational industrial relations, show much 
lower level of industrial disputes than Korea.  From a comparative 
perspective, while the number of disputes has generally decreased in most 
countries since 1998, Korea stands out with the number of disputes 
increasing sharply after the financial crisis of 1997.  
 
<Table 3> International Comparison of Yearly Changes in Industrial Disputes: All 
industries, working days lost per 1,000 inhabitants1)  
Average2)
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 1993 
～1997 
1998 
～2002 
1993 
～2002 
Australia 
Canada 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Japan 
Korea3)
Sweden 
U.K. 
U.S. 
OECD 
100 
132 
48 
18 
236 
2 
110 
54 
30 
36 
48 
76 
137 
39 
7 
238 
2 
119 
15 
13 
45 
61 
79 
133 
300 
8 
65 
1 
30 
177 
18 
51 
77 
131 
280 
57 
3 
137 
1 
68 
17 
55 
42 
51 
77 
296 
42 
2 
84 
2 
33 
7 
10 
38 
41 
72 
196 
51 
1 
40 
2 
118 
0 
11 
42 
46 
88 
190 
63 
2 
62 
2 
108 
22 
10 
16 
29 
61 
125 
114 
0 
59 
1 
142 
0 
20 
163 
90 
50 
162 
82 
1 
67 
1 
79 
3 
20 
9 
29 
32 
218 
NA 
10 
311 
0 
111 
0 
51 
5 
51 
 
 
90 
93 
197 
98 
8 
152 
2 
71 
54 
25 
42 
56 
60 
178 
NA 
3 
110 
1 
112 
5 
23 
47 
49 
75 
187 
NA 
5 
131 
1 
92 
29 
24 
45 
52 
Sources: Monger, J. (2004) “International comparisons of labour disputes in 2002,” Labour Market Trends, April, p. 146.  
           Annual Data from the Ministry of Labor.  
           “Economically Active Population,” the National Statistics Office.  
Notes: 1) “inhabitants” means those employed; a few numbers are estimates.  
2) The annual averages of years for which data was available were weighted by the number of employed.  
3) For Korea, data from the Ministry of Labor and “Economically Active Population” were used.  
               “NA” means “no data available.”  
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Looking at the data, following questions can be posed: where did the 
trade-union militancy and the confrontational nature of industrial relations in 
Korea come from? Why are these characteristics found in industrial relations 
at large enterprises that provide stable employment and enjoy monopolistic 
market positions?  Based on the premise that solving these questions is the 
purpose of this study, the following section will focus on the development 
process of enterprise-based industrial relations and militancy as a strategic 
choice of the Korean labor movement.  
 
2. Development process of enterprise-based labor relations in Korea: 
systems and strategies  
 
The size of the labor market in Korea expanded significantly in the 
process of economic development.  Two of the notable characteristics of the 
Korean labor market that are most often pointed out are the very high 
turnover of the workforce and the difficulties of companies in securing 
workers needed for their businesses (Eoo, 1992; Park, 1992).  Usually, rapid 
expansion of the labor market amid fast-paced economic development raises 
the rate of worker turnover due to the large-scale supply of jobs. However, 
given the phases of economic development, the labor turnover in Korea is still 
relatively higher than in other countries of comparable conditions.  This is 
evidenced by the fact that the average years of service of Korean workers 
between 1979 and 1989 were much lower than those of Japan, which had 
already experienced industrialization from 1960 to 1970 (Park, 1992).  
  Another notable fact about the Korean labor market is that there was no 
difference in wage levels between SMEs and large companies in Korea until 
the mid-1980s, with human capital controlled, and that workers moved 
relatively freely between the two sectors (Jeong, 1991; Koo, 1990; Song, 
1991).  The main reason behind this is found in Korean companies’ pursuance 
of mass production methods based on simple and general technologies (Song, 
1991: 220-221).  Moreover, the government’s provision of a large number of 
semi-skilled workers to companies through directly operated vocational 
training centers, and its control over the labor movement and the wage levels 
of large companies, resulted in a relatively monotonous and stable labor 
market with small gaps in terms of turnover and wage levels between 
companies of different sizes (Steers et al., 1989; Bognanno, 1988; Kim, 1988).  
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  The Korean labor market started to show a sign of segregation from 
1987, as wage increases and improvements in employment conditions were 
achieved at large companies through large-scale industrial disputes. The 
ratio of average wage between large companies with 500 or more employees 
and small ones with fewer than 99 employees increased to 122.5:100 in 1990 
from 102.9:100 in 1987.   
  The difference is affected by the union movement, which exploded from 
1987; or, to put it differently, it reflects the concentration of gains made by 
the union movement at large companies since the eruption of the labor 
movement.  The long period of control over the labor movement by the 
government under military regimes and their recognition only of enterprise-
based companies before 1987 somehow opened the path towards a 
segregated labor movement and industrial relations centered on large 
companies. However, considering that it clearly had rooms to move away 
from the enterprise-based labor movement to a more concentrated union 
structure or industrial relations, the Korean labor movement must have made 
strategic choices to remain at the enterprise level while the democratic 
movement was flaring in politics and society.  
In other words, the changes in the environment toward a democratic 
society should not be considered a direct factor determining the 
characteristics of industrial relations.  The way employers use such changes 
in the market environment strategically, and the way trade unions utilize the 
political environment for their strategies are what determines industrial 
relations. The main actors in industrial relations, faced with opportunities and 
pressures brought about by changes in the environment, made strategic 
choices amid many restrictions.  According to the theory of strategic choices, 
the results of their choices are expressed as characteristics of the industrial 
relations (Meltz, 1985:315-334).  This theory explains changes in industrial 
relations as a result of interactions between outside pressures and philosophy, 
values, and strategies of organizational actors at various levels of 
organizations (Kochan, Katz and McKersie, 1986).  
From the viewpoint of this theory, large companies with monopolistic 
status guaranteed by the authoritarian regimes before 1987 saw the 
privileges, protection and regulations of the government against inter-
company competition gave way to a principle of competition among large 
companies within the market, and made the choice to deal with issues of 
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industrial relations inwardly. They opted for more effective stability of 
business management by minimizing the influence of industry-wide and 
central-level industrial relations (as opposed to company level), and creating 
an internal labor market to realize employment stability and wage increases at 
the enterprise level. 
Meanwhile, trade unions at large companies pushed the growth of trade 
unions as part of the social movement during the initial stages of the new 
political environment called “democratic society.” However, they came to 
realize that enterprise-based labor relations could be more effective in 
collecting the due wages--unpaid even in the monopolistic context.  
Moreover, they believed that the labor market inside their companies and the 
new system of collective bargaining could sufficiently provide both economic 
gains and support for the causes of union movement.  
 
Ultimately, the trade unions of large companies in Korea chose 
decentralized, enterprise-based labor relations when given the strategic 
choice in the new environment after 1987. However, the unexpected outcome 
of that choice was that it led to frequent strikes and nearly constant conflicts 
during the following decade, instead of the kind of flexible and cooperative 
industrial relations commonly found in decentralized labor relations. This is 
explained – and will be discussed in the next section - as a result of the 
politicization of industrial relations, whereby enterprise-level labor relations 
were not developed as responses to the market environment, but rather as 
adjustments of different interests between labor and company management 
that were dependent on politics. What this phenomenon means is that while 
industrial relations at large companies in Korea since 1987 have outwardly 
appeared to be similar to the development process of industrial relations in 
advanced countries, inwardly, they have progressed in a totally different way.  
In recent years, industrial relations in advanced countries are changing 
significantly. Above all, in terms of where industrial relation is going, there is 
an active movement toward greater flexibility in labor relations at the 
company level, directing the focus of labor and management to more micro-
level matters. The decline of trade unions has become visible, driving 
attempts to find a new type of industrial relations at the enterprise level. 
Innovative production organizations and participation of workers in the 
process of production have been initiated by companies. High-performance 
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systems based on the technological development of workers are being 
established as a mainstream of industrial relations in advanced countries 
(Locke et al, 1995; Appelbaum and Batt, 1994).  
In the U.S., until the mid 1980s, business management strategies resorted 
to mass production and price competition, disregarding the role of human 
resources. Consequently, workers were dependent on strong unions to 
protect their interests and concentrate their capacity on bargaining for 
distribution (Bluestone and Bluestone, 1992).  The new economic 
environment of the 1980s, however, changed the goal of union movement to 
some extent, from a distribution-oriented to a production-focused principle 
(Freeman and Medoff, 1984; Kochan, Katz, and McKersie, 1986; Hecksher, 
1988).  
Employers’ strategies are definitely a critical factor moving the focus of 
industrial relations.  However, the responsive strategies of the labor 
movement are an equally important factor in shaping industrial relations. 
Changes towards decentralized labor movement will be possible only through 
the response of the labor movement to the shifting focus of industrial 
relations, or through the results of the shift itself. Decentralization of labor 
movement is expressed into two aspects. Under the first aspect, the 
consolidation of the union movement at the national level will be weakened 
but the independence of subsidiary organizations will increase (Baglioni, 
1990). Usually, the power of a central organization at the national level to 
control industrial or sectoral unions is being diminished in Western countries 
(Crouch, 1994:268). On the other hand, working conditions which had been 
decided at the national or sectoral level are now being decided at the 
enterprise or workplace level. Certainly, the decentralization of union 
movement is not a uniform trend in advanced countries.  In Norway and 
Portugal, bargaining structure is being more centralized.  In the Netherlands 
and Italy, decentralization was the dominant trend in the 1980s, but in the 
1990s, it was reversed (OECD, 1997). Nevertheless, it is undeniable that 
decentralization of labor movement and collective bargaining is a general 
trend in most highly industrialized countries.  
It is important to note that decentralization of collective bargaining is 
manifested quite differently depending on countries and industries. So, it is 
important to distinguish between organized and disorganized decentralization, 
and between coordinated and uncoordinated decentralization (Traxler, 1995). 
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The analysis of decentralization trends must include decentralization with 
coordination, and consider this at the collective bargaining level as well.  In 
this respect, decentralization since 1980 can be divided into disorganized and 
organized decentralization. The former is found in the U.K., New Zealand, and 
the U.S., and the latter in Austria, Denmark, and Germany (Traxler, 1995: 3-
15).  
Then where does Korea stand?  Since 1987, labor relations in large 
companies centered around the issue of distribution, and were rarely 
interested in the paradigm of the high-performance workplace. Labor 
movement and collective bargaining have developed towards disorganized 
decentralization from their inception.  Nowadays, though there is an effort 
toward consolidation at some industry-level unions, it still is not attracting 
enough interest among labor leaders and management at large companies.  
Trade unions of large companies only come together, though very loosely, 
when political issues affecting their welfare arise.  When they are dealing 
with issues of wages or working conditions at the industry or central level, 
they remain disaggregated. To make matters worse, the union movement in 
Korea has experienced a second wave of decentralization, whereby the group 
consolidation and continuation are diluted through the formation of different 
factions within their organizations and the grouping or dismembering among 
themselves during the process of developing into enterprise unit trade unions 
since 1987. 
In summary, labor and management relations and union movement at large 
companies since 1987 has developed enterprise-level industrial relations in 
terms of the structure of the system, but failed to take advantage of the 
decentralization by building flexible and cooperative industrial relations in 
strategic terms. As time progressed, labor and management at large 
companies became used to the strategies of putting pressure on each other 
rather than coordinating their mutual interests. Union movement also resulted 
in a second decentralization, where the factions of trade unions, rather than 
the hard work to provide an adjusted system beyond the enterprise level, 
became the force for change in the lines of the unions.  
The main culprit of such abnormalities is the uncompromising nature of 
strategies by both labor and management, under which militant political 
actions are employed to resolve the conflicts of interest, notwithstanding the 
specific issues between employees and employers of individual companies. 
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The following section will discuss the reasons as to why the labor and 
management at large companies have taken the uncompromising course of 
politicization.  
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3. Growth of chaebol and democratic labor movement: twins of 
politicization  
 
The Korean economy developed rapidly from the mid 1960s to the mid 
1990s, as illustrated by the 9% average GNP growth rate during that time, 
and the high rate of growth has more or less been maintained until now. Two 
notable aspects of this breakneck development have been the remarkable 
growth of the private-sector economy, though backed by the active 
intervention of the state, and the control of the economy by a few chaebol.  
Though there is no existing categorization of business types in which 
Korean chaebol fall under, chaebols are similar to the corporate groups of 
Japan. However, in contrast to their Japanese counterparts, they are directly 
operated by owners and their families, and established business groups 
networked through financial institutions. Chaebol is a large-scale business 
group developed under the sponsorship of the nation and directly operated 
and controlled by owners and their families.  
The particular background contributing to the rapid development of 
chaebol during the industrialization process included several elements. For 
one thing, the pillar of economic development during the last several decades 
has been the export-oriented industrialization led by the government. From 
the early stage of the economic development, Korean government intensely 
supported and nurtured large companies through its exports-first policy; and 
to this end, it provided favors related to exports and imports, loans, and 
various tax breaks to the chaebol (Chang 1991; Jones and Sakong, 1980; 
Hamilton and Biggart 1988).  
Secondly, the chaebols were able to minimize failure in the market through 
the practice of mutual investment and through diversifying their businesses to 
unrelated industries (Cheong and Yang, 1992).  The majority of the 30 largest 
chaebols in Korea are engaged in a number of diverse sectors, not only in 
manufacturing but in a vast array of other sectors such as trade, distribution, 
construction, banking, and transportation. This expansive array of businesses 
is interconnected and brought together under the direct control of the owners.  
The government’s direct and indirect assistance to the chaebol’s business 
activities, and owners’ direct control over their various activities in the 
market, have resulted in the chaebols having the least professionalized 
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business structures.  The need for the division between ownership and 
business management, characteristic of the growth of large companies in 
modern times (Chandler, 1977), did not emerge as a priority in Korea.  
Due to the high risk of failure in the market, to some extent, the chaebol 
owners could not help managing and controlling their companies as a family 
matter without depending on professional managers. In a situation where 
informal and sometimes illegal transactions with the government were key to 
the growth of companies, and where secret mechanisms had to be maintained 
to secure management rights in the business group, they needed to fill the 
upper ladders of the companies with family members and associates who 
would guarantee a mutual trust (Shin and Chin, 1989; Kim, 1992).  
This background on how chaebol and their affiliates developed provides a 
clue as to why they dealt with labor relations in a particular manner. For the 
most part, top managers--chaebol owners, their families and associates--did 
not have to make innovative industrial relations and high-performance 
workplaces their priority goals in business management.  Negotiating with or 
persuading trade unions was a waste of energy; and even performance was a 
matter of no little importance, because company growth, mergers & 
acquisitions, and even success or failure itself were determined by the 
environment outside of the market.  Consequently, the interest of chief 
executive officers was focused on political deals.  
At the same time, union participation in business management and 
democratization of corporate organization were more than just important 
variables influencing management performance. The voices of trade unions 
were a matter of concern because they could threaten the maintenance of the 
current ownership structure or lead to the exposure of business secrets that 
companies needed to keep.  Thus, the chaebol moved to preempt or quell the 
voices before they grew, except for wage demands. As a result, the functions 
of collective bargaining were limited to increasing the wage level, and 
corporate social responsibility and business innovation were exempted as 
subjects of bargaining. Many large-company managers abhorred the 
existence of trade unions or their expanded influence not for the reason of 
their negative effects on company productivity but because they were a force 
threatening the controlling power of management.   
As such, the role of trade unions demanded by the companies was to focus 
on wage increases and to restrain themselves from raising their voices on 
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other issues.  Such demands appeared to be accepted by the trade unions, 
whose responsive strategies were matched to the strategies of the companies.  
Large company trade unions in Korea formally played this role from 1987 on.  
To be clear, however, the trade unions of large companies and their umbrella 
unions did raise many important issues in the process of political 
democratization and struggle for social reform.  However, these attempts 
were diluted to some degree the negative impressions caused by the 
monopolistic position of the unions with regard to wages and welfare. 
However, one issue that continued to be pointed out most strongly by trade 
unions of large companies was the outdated model of “ownership 
management,” which served as the best leverage by which the trade unions 
could put pressure on employers.  Employers could not easily control the 
unions when they kept raising their voices on ownership management as the 
source of many issues between labor and management.  
The state-led economic development, the authoritarian control over the 
labor movement, and the government’s interventions in industrial relations 
were unarguably behind the politicization after 1987 of the labor movement at 
large companies (Lee, 2000; Kang, 1998).  Despite the effects of this 
politicization, the union movement in the 1990s, based on enterprises, bore 
fruit in the form of wages and benefits at the enterprise level, while 
neglecting preparations for social reforms or macroeconomic adjustment.  
For that matter, some argue that the labor movement in Korea in the late 
1990s was isolated at horizontal, vertical, and societal levels.  They were 
isolated at horizontal level because of their fragmentation and failure to 
achieve solidarity among workers.  They were also isolated at vertical level 
because their objective was compromised by capitalists and lost their 
independence.  Lastly, they were isolated at the societal level because of the 
marginalization of the labor movement (Kim, 1993:239).  Politicization was 
expressed as militant labor movement, while the bargaining structure and 
union system at the enterprise level remained unchanged.  Employers lacked 
either cause or determination to suppress militant trade unions’ actions inside 
companies, which means that both labor and management have played 
political games.  
How are political deals made between labor and management?  First of all, 
trade unions send signals to employers through strikes. The strategy of “first 
strikes, then negotiations” has led of frequent and often illegal strikes.  The 
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logic behind such high frequency of strikes is that it will be more effective for 
unions to push the employer into corner by elevating what they want as social 
issues rather than talking with the employer.  
The idea that trade unions bring about wage increases has already 
become an established theory (Freeman and Medoff, 1984).  However, 
different opinions exist on the strategies as to how unions induce wage 
increases. Wage increases have the effect of winning support for the “labor 
market inside the companies” from trade unions, but it is clear that strikes by 
trade unions are a valuable means to raise wages. Conventional wisdom tells 
us that strikes for the purpose of wage increase are a basic strategy that 
trade unions will resort to. Nevertheless, a school of Neo-classical 
economics including Hicks tends to regard strikes as an unreasonable choice 
(Hicks, 1963; Reder and Neumann, 1980). They believe that reasonable 
negotiating partners, considering costs and damages of strikes, can settle on 
the wage level before strikes happen.  
Then, how should strikes for social and political purposes be understood? 
Some critics point out that labor movement fascinated by the power to control 
the workplace and driven by social issues will disperse the capacity of trade 
unions to focus on wage increases, making it difficult to deliver the 
reasonable wage increases that the members desire (Cochran, 1977). In fact, 
the wage issue has been singled out by many to explain strikes in advanced 
industrialized society (Edwards, 1981; Shorter and Tilly, 1974; Walsh, 1983). 
Few attempts, however, have been made to explain why trade unions bear the 
costs of strikes by launching strikes driven by political and social issues 
instead of strikes confined to the wage issue and other issues that are 
directly beneficial.  According to neo-classical or institutional theories, 
strikes for purposes other than wage increases have been regarded as 
unintended or uncontrolled collective action not strategically chosen by trade 
unions, or as the result of the failure of reasonable bargaining.  
According to theories explaining the politicized strike structure, the best 
strategy of the labor movement is to have more strikes. Whether that type of 
strike succeeded or failed, or what issues the strike upheld is not important.  
What is important is simply to have a large number of strikes.  Frequent 
strikes will send the message to the other bargaining party that workers are 
very much interested in the strikes themselves until their demand is met 
regardless of the cost (Cohn, 1993). This theory supports the arguments of 
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Piven and Cloward (1977), who posit that frequent social disruption by the 
poor class will guarantee redistribution of wealth from the upper class. 
Though the theories arguing for the usefulness of economically practical 
labor movement hold that the concentrated attention of trade unions on social 
issues will result in deterring the trade unions from achieving their ultimate 
objective of monetary gains, there is no evidence that social issues and 
monetary gains are completely unrelated. In fact, strikes by trade unions over 
issues of working-hour reduction or industrial safety often led to high wage 
increases with little improvement regarding the issues on table. In a word, 
union movement for political purposes and its show of militancy using strikes 
has been a very useful strategy for achieving economic gains.  
Strikes were good leverage to raise the political status of labor movement 
in the society.  They were an effective means to break the control over the 
labor movement by the authoritarian government that abhorred strikes, and to 
achieve a democratic society.  Government policy before 1987 banned any 
“destructive” action, and the policy was successful in minimizing the number 
of such actions, with some side effects. The drawback of the policy was the 
huge impact of labor disputes that might have amounted to nothing in a 
situation with less or no control on policy makers as well as the general 
public. The more state officials tried to minimize disputes, the bigger the 
impact became on politics and society. Labor disputes were often considered 
as indices pointing to the state of crisis in overall industrial relations, and 
induced government officials take immediate actions such as providing new 
policies or laws with a view of preventing the recurrence of similar types of 
disputes (Choi, 1988:281-282).  
Enterprise-based labor movement with politicized lines was closely 
aligned with politicized movement at upper and lower levels, and thus often 
expanded and reproduced.  At the upper level was the Korean Confederation 
of Trade Unions (KCTU), which emerged in the 1990s, and at the lower level 
there were factions or workplace organizations developed within the 
enterprise-based unions. 
The union movement at large companies has been closely related to the 
democratic labor movement, which began in earnest in 1987. The fact that 
most trade unions of large companies belong to the KCTU, and not the 
Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) that existed prior to 1987, shows 
that the strategies of large company trade unions are in compliance with the 
 16 
policy lines of KCTU.  
 
The policy lines set by FKTU are tilted toward economic unionism in the 
broader context. Its movement methods are based on economic struggle 
including collective bargaining, and when necessary it has actively 
participated in national decision-making processes. In contrast, KCTU’s 
movement lines reject cooperation between labor and management, target 
social reforms, and prioritize the integration of economic and political 
struggle (Kang, 1998). For KCTU, comprised mainly of large companies and 
the public sector, strikes are considered as an effective means through which 
democratic movement will develop and monopolistic gains of large company 
managements will be distributed through wages, and also as an important 
engine of organizational growth.   
It is an irony that the confrontational, militant labor movement of KCTU, 
having emerged as an alternative to the traditional labor movement of FKTU, 
has made it possible for the existing enterprise-based union structure and the 
labor market inside companies to remain. Though KCTU set the establishment 
of an industry-level union system as an ultimate goal, it maintained the labor 
market structure at the enterprise level and focused on the struggle to 
achieve the three basic labor rights. As KCTU movement was mobilized, its 
recognition by the government became a fundamental issue.  Other related 
issues have surfaced at the same time are the prohibition of multiple unions 
and third-party intervention, and the scope of essential public services.  
Different from the lines of KCTU at the upper level, informal workplace 
organizations at the lower level became strongly segregated, turning 
enterprise-based unions into a battleground between the organizations. Such 
informal workplace units were directed by the movement of the Committee to 
Pursue Democratic Unions with an objective of stopping trade unions from 
becoming bureaucratic or yellow unions. Their function of preventing labor 
unions from becoming bureaucratic organization and resist the domination of 
capitalists over labor is becoming more and more important.  With the 
increase of their influence, the need for better organization of these 
workplace units also emerged. 
The democratic labor movement that lasted from late 1987 to the early 
1990s, led to the solidifying of “workplace organizations” by labor activists at 
unit workplaces. These activists continued to lead strikes, accumulating 
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achievements that would benefit the democratic operation of trade unions. 
These workplace organizations have held nationwide gatherings since the late 
1990s.  They are developing in an ongoing situation of cooperation, tension 
and conflict with executives of trade unions, depending on particular political 
lines and policies. 
The workplace units, which started as a check-and-balance against union 
executives, have reshaped themselves since democratic executives took 
office. Especially in the case of large-scale factories, as the union movement 
was being revitalized, workplace activists were growing in large numbers.  
Some of them were self-taught activists, but others were trained in alliance 
with student activists.  
 
In the case of the Hyundai Motors Company Union, which is one of the 
most representative large-enterprise unions of Korea, there are more than 10 
affiliated field organizations with more than 1,000 total members. When a 
decision is made at the representatives’ assembly, the existence of more than 
1,000 union activists is a great force as far as the union is concerned (Jin, 
2004). On the other hand, from the perspective of the company, field activists 
are threats, as they are a force capable of stirring up the workers’ opinion 
and atmosphere in the field. However, the limitation of such field 
organizations is that they are buried in the internal activity of the corporation. 
The power within a company is limited to the union executives and 
representatives. Popular leaders, who rose through in-company activity, have 
no choice but to run for union officials in order to engage in political activity. 
This caused overheated and excessively competitive elections for the union 
president and representative positions.  
As a result, the enterprise-based unions of Korea have continuously 
received demands to reproduce political lines, under the controls and 
connections from above and below. The main officials and activists of KCTU 
are linked not just by structure, but also by human connections to the officials 
of enterprise-based unions. Moreover, the union officials and executives have 
either very close connections with the various factions or are influenced by 
them. Thus, the structural arrangement of unions makes it hard to maintain 
the stability as a unit union or consistent leadership.  
Under such unstable political lines, the most fundamental means through 
which a union leadership could receive support from the majority of its 
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members was to win higher wage increases from the employer. This satisfied 
the interests of the enterprise-based unions and all the connected groups, 
and in long term, it was the only way that unions could achieve the dual 
objectives of consolidating the unstable leadership and receiving recognition 
of its capabilities from the government.  
 
4. Change in Enterprise-Based Industrial Relations: Weakening of the 
Voice and Strengthening of the Monopoly 
 
The so-called ’87 labor regime, which effectively attained higher wages 
by demonstrating its militant and confrontational side, faced a great 
environmental change due to the structural adjustments that began following 
the 1997 foreign currency crisis. This produced a sense of crisis and the 
concern that by maintaining the previous strategy of militancy, workers would 
lose their face as well as their actual interests. According to a survey that 
KCTU carried out as part of its efforts to reform its organization in October 
2004, targeting officials of central, industry-wide and unit union organizations, 
63.6% of the respondents replied that KCTU faced a crisis.  At the time, the 
two major trade union centers of Korea had declared a joint struggle to 
oppose dispatch work, call for the guarantee of public servants’ basic labor 
rights and block the Korea-Japan FTA. It was a time for elevation of the 
struggle.  Even so, almost two thirds of the respondents considered it a 
crisis situation.  
The unionization rate has been stationary at around 11% to 12% for 7 
years since 1997, in spite of the strong determination and efforts by the two 
major trade union federations and their affiliates to recruit new members. 
Mobilized struggles such as general strikes or rallies have lacked supports, 
and their function as “weapons” has been weakened as public opinion turned 
its back on the union movement. Struggle for social reform also has not been 
able to trigger either field workers’ interest or their anger.  
Wage struggle, which was the central axis for the union movement until 
the mid-1990s became an issue of secondary importance, and the issues of 
economic crisis and IMF relief, and the unemployment issue has become the 
primary social concern. Because unions had difficulty in pushing the agenda 
of employment stability of regular workers forward, they used small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs) or non-regular workers as a protective barrier to 
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guard their narrow interest. As economic bipolarization deepens, wage gaps 
between large enterprises and SMEs, and between regular and non-regular 
jobs are increasing. Even though the labor movement has made closing the 
gaps as its primary task, no significant advancements have come out so far. It 
definitely seemed that the democratic voice and influence demonstrated by 
the unions of large enterprises since 1987 had reached their limits. So, 
instead, a line of movement that used the monopolistic status of large 
company unions to its advantage was reinforced.  
When it comes to the pattern of disputes, the transition from voice role to 
monopoly role can be confirmed with data on labor disputes. Labor disputes in 
Korea increased explosively since 1987, but reached stabilization since 
the ’90s. Then, they began to rise again following the economic crisis in 1997 
(See <Table 4>). In terms of the number of participants in the disputes, 
400,000 participated disputes in 1989, but the number decreased by about 
one tenth to 40,000 in 1990. Recently the number increased again to around 
100,000. In this sense, the period from ’95 to ’97 was a short but very stable 
period. This was because the unions could enjoy the negligence of the 
enterprises, which were managed laxly relying on the economic boom and did 
not need to exert special efforts for their struggle. This laxity contributed 
partially to the economic crisis in 1997.  
 
 
<Table 4> Main Labor Dispute Indices  
  No. of Disputes No. of Participants Lost Days of Work 
1988 1,873 293,455 5,400,837 
1989 1,616 409,134 6,351,443 
1990 322 133,916 4,487,151 
1991 234 175,089 3,271,334 
1992 235 105,034 1,527,612 
1993 144 108,577 1,308,326 
1994 121 104,339 1,484,368 
1995 88 49,717 392,581 
1996 85 79,495 892,987 
1997 78 43,991 444,720 
1998 129 146,065 1,452,096 
1999 198 92,026 1,366,281 
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2000 250 177,969 1,893,563 
2001 235 88,548 1,083,079 
2002 322 93,859 1,580,404 
2003 320 137,241 1,298,663 
Original Source: Ministry of Labor. 
Source: KLI, ｢Monthly Labor Trends for each year｣. 
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<Table 5> Strike Tendency by Year  
  Days of Work Lost Wage Earners Strike Tendency 
1988 5,400,837 9,610 562.0 
1989 6,351,443 10,390 611.3 
1990 4,487,151 10,950 409.8 
1991 3,271,334 11,699 279.6 
1992 1,527,612 11,910 128.3 
1993 1,308,326 11,944 109.5 
1994 1,484,368 12,479 119.0 
1995 392,581 12,899 30.4 
1996 892,987 13,200 67.7 
1997 444,720 13,404 33.2 
1998 1,452,096 12,296 118.1 
1999 1,366,281 12,663 107.9 
2000 1,893,563 13,360 141.7 
2001 1,083,079 13,659 79.3 
2002 1,580,404 14,181 111.4 
2003 1,298,663 14,402 90.2 
Source: Ministry of Labor. 
Note: Strike Tendency=(Work Days Lost/Number of Wage Earners) 1000. 
 
 
The strike tendency index by year, which is measured by dividing work 
days lost by number of wage earners (<Table 5>), demonstrates a low strike 
tendency only from ’95 to ’97, and a high tendency for strike before and after 
that period.  
If we analyze the cause of labor disputes according to phenomena, 
following 1987, the main objective of disputes was wage increases, however, 
after the mid 1990s, the number of disputes concerning other collective 
agreements exceeded those related to wages. Recently the disputes have 
been over qualitative issues such as structural adjustment, employment 
stability, working hours, welfare, etc., rather than simply distribution-related 
issues (See <Table 6>).  
 
<표 6> Trends of Labor Disputes by Cause  
(Unit：cases)  
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 Total Deferred Wage 
Wage 
Increase Dismissal 
Collective 
Agreement Other
1990 322 10 167 18 127 
1991 234 5 132 7 90 
1992 235 27 134 4 49 21 
1993 144 11 66 1 52 14 
1994 121 6 51 3 42 19 
1995 88 - 33 1 49 5 
1996 85 1 19 - 62 3 
1997 78 3 18 - 51 6 
1998 129 23 28 3 57 10 
1999 198 22 40 - 89 47 
2000 250 7 47 2 167 27 
2001 235 6 59 - 149 21 
2002 322 2 44 8 249 19 
2003 320 5 43 3 249 20 
Source：Internal material of Ministry of Labor, for each year.  
Note：The “Other” category includes improvement of working conditions, 
shortening working time, lay offs, dismissal following company 
transfers, opposition against receiving voluntary retirees, opposing 
the “small president system”, opposing mergers, personnel 
transfers, etc. Particularly, in 1990 and 1991, a separate category 
for “collective bargaining” was not created, resulting in a high 
proportion of “others.”  
 
 
Meanwhile, by the size of business, while the rate of disputes in large 
enterprises, particularly those with 1,000 or employees, have decreased, the 
share of disputes occurring in smaller enterprises with less than 300 
employees has increased (See <Table 7>). But when considering the fact that 
the number of employees of large enterprises is significantly smaller than 
those of medium-sized enterprises, 40 strikes per year in businesses with 
1,000 or more employees is by no means a small number, and the influence is 
quite large as well.  
 
In terms of solution methods of disputes, while most disputes were solved 
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through labor-management agreements since 1987, recently there has been a 
tendency that the number of conclusions through mutual agreement has 
decreased, while the number of voluntary ending of the dispute by unions has 
increased (<Table 8>). This suggests that many of the strikes were initiated 
based on unions’ unreasonable evaluations and objectives.  These 
unreasonable demands simply end up in self-termination, without mutual 
agreement between labor and management. Interestingly, more of such 
withdrawals have been seen in strikes that were carried out for purposes 
concerning social reform or political objectives, compared to strikes for wage 
increases.  
Mulling over these recent changes, we finally have reasons to hope that a 
fundamental change that can radically improve Korea’s imbalanced industrial 
relations is in the foreseeable future. The fact that the issues of wage hikes, 
which so far has been the dominant motivation for bargaining and strike, is 
becoming less important as the cause of industrial action indicates that a soil 
is ripe for more mature collective bargaining situation that does not involve 
unilateral strikes.  The recent phenomena in which certain unions of large 
firms engaged in strikes in an attempt to raise the wages to an unreasonably 
high level faced negative public opinion as well as loss of support even within 
the labor movement demonstrate that, unlike in the past, society does not 
want to be bothered with firm-specific issues like wages.  It can be said that 
the newly formed social consensus around wage issues does not tolerate 
wage issues to be brought out to the societal level, but encourages it to be 
dealt with between the concerned parties internally. Today in Korea, the 
issue of wage is establishing itself as a normal industrial relations topic, 
based on rational negotiation and compromise among the concerned parties.  
 
<Table 7> Incidence of Strikes by Size of Business 
  Total 
Fewer than 
100 
Employees 
100~299 300~999 1000 or More
198
8 
137
9 
465(33.7
) 
448(32.5
) 
297(21.5
) 
169(12.3
) 
198
9 
131
9 
498(37.8
) 
431(32.7
) 
235(17.8
) 
155(11.8
) 
199 320 84(26.3) 122(38.1 63(19.7) 51(15.9) 
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0 ) 
199
1 238 43(18.1) 81(34.0) 61(25.6) 53(22.3) 
199
2 237 64(27.0) 79(33.3) 59(24.9) 35(14.8) 
199
3 150 28(18.7) 51(34.0) 37(24.7) 34(22.7) 
199
4 104 26(25.0) 35(33.7) 17(16.3) 26(25.0) 
199
5 88 22(25.0) 23(26.1) 29(33.0) 14(15.9) 
199
6 85 14(16.5) 23(27.1) 23(27.1) 25(29.4) 
199
7 78 19(24.4) 26(33.3) 18(23.1) 15(19.2) 
199
8 129 27(20.9) 35(27.1) 34(26.4) 33(25.6) 
199
9 198 44(22.2) 55(27.8) 38(19.2) 61(30.8) 
200
0 250 75(30.0) 57(22.8) 63(25.2) 55(22.0) 
200
1 235 82(34.9) 67(28.5) 52(22.1) 34(14.5) 
200
2 326 
107(32.8
) 
112(34.4
) 64(19.6) 43(13.2) 
200
3 327 
101(30.9
) 
124(37.9
) 62(19.0) 40(12.2) 
Source: Korea Labor Institute「Labor Dispute DB」. 
Note: Numbers in ( ) indicate component ratio.  
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<Table 8> Number of Disputes by Resolution Methods  
  
  Overall 
Labor-
Management 
Agreement 
Judicial or 
Administrative 
Procedure 
Voluntary 
Resolution Other 
1988 1379 1345(97.5) 29(2.1) 0(0.0) 5(0.4) 
1989 1319 1257(95.3) 62(4.7) 0(0.0) 0(0.0) 
1990 320 230(71.9) 8(2.5) 68(21.3) 14(4.4) 
1991 237 176(74.3) 9(3.8) 38(16.0) 14(5.9) 
1992 235 161(68.5) 6(2.6) 48(20.4) 20(8.5) 
1993 150 131(87.3) 5(3.3) 10(6.7) 4(2.7) 
1994 97 61(62.9) 0(0.0) 36(37.1) 0(0.0) 
1996 85 84(98.8) 0(0.0) 1(1.2) 0(0.0) 
1997 78 55(70.5) 0(0.0) 23(29.5) 0(0.0) 
1998 129 82(63.6) 1(0.8) 46(35.7) 0(0.0) 
1999 198 150(75.8) 0(0.0) 48(24.2) 0(0.0) 
2000 235 189(80.4) 1(0.4) 44(18.7) 1(0.4) 
2002 317 236(74.4) 1(0.3) 64(20.2) 16(5.0) 
2003 310 201(64.8) 0(0.0) 97(31.3) 12(3.9) 
Source: KLI 「Labor Dispute DB」. 
Note: Data for years 1995 and 2001 are unavailable.  
 
If conditions for “quiet” compromise on wages are reinforced in the 
corporate sector, the free strike strategies—including illegal strikes—of the 
conventional labor movement since 1987 will possibly diminish.  The 
diminishment of confrontational strike, in turn, can open possibilities for the 
ideals and organizational capability of the labor movement can be diverted to 
promoting political or social reform. Moreover, in this process, the large 
enterprise sector, which has played the leading role since ’87, could fall back 
from the forefront, while the union of non-regular workers and the public 
sector emerge as the core of the politically motivated strike movement.  
However, even if the militancy and tough political line are weakening, as 
long as the bipolarized structure of large enterprises and small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) remain, there is no clear solution to ease or prevent the 
increasing sectoral income gap, which has become aggravated since the 
foreign currency crisis in Asia (<Table 9>). The possibility of solidarity 
among different income classes and different sizes of enterprises remains low 
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within the monopolistic state of industrial relations in each corporation.  
  
<Table 9 > Income Distribution Trends of Urban Working Households  
Income Share by Quintile (in %) 
1st 
Quintile(A) 
 2nd 
Quintile(B) 
3rd 
Quintile(C)
4th 
Quintile(D)
5th 
Quintile(E)
Income 
Share 
(E/A) 
Gini’s 
Coeffi-
cient 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
8.3 
7.4 
7.3 
7.5 
7.5 
7.7 
7.4 
13.6 
12.8 
12.6 
12.7 
12.5 
12.7 
13.2 
17.7 
17.1 
16.9 
17.0 
16.9 
17.1 
17.4 
23.2 
22.9 
22.9 
22.7 
22.7 
22.9 
23.2 
37.2 
39.8 
40.2 
40.1 
40.3 
39.7 
38.8 
4.49 
5.41 
5.49 
5.32 
5.36 
5.18 
5.22 
0.283 
0.316 
0.320 
0.317 
0.319 
0.312 
0.306 
Note: Income Share by Quintile 
Source: National Statistical Office, 「Urban Household Bulletin」, for each 
year.  
 
5. The Future of Enterprise-Based Industrial Relations: Challenges and 
Alternatives  
 
During Korea’s industrialization process, the export-oriented development 
strategy rapidly expanded the labor-intensive production system based on 
low wages.  On the one hand, the expansion imposed limits on the collective 
labor rights, while on the other hand, expanding jobs and raising wages 
steadily that resulted in the improvement of workers’ quality of life. In other 
words, during the 70s and 80s, while the collective labor-management 
relations such as the right of association, the right of collective bargaining 
and the right to strike were restricted, individual labor-management relations 
such as restriction on dismissals, employment stability, wage hikes based on 
seniority were provided as unquestioned benefits. Such a labor system was a 
natural outcome of Korea’s globalization process during that era, and was 
internally justified on the basis of the miraculous transformation from a 
poverty-stricken country without jobs to one of the fastest growing 
economies in the world with less that 2% unemployment rate.  
Nevertheless, such labor system began to rattle as it passed through two 
pivotal moments in history. The first historical juncture was the so called 
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“great struggle of the workers” in 1987, and the other was the integration into 
the international capital market, which began with Korea’s attempt to join 
OECD in the mid-1990s and the foreign currency crisis in ’97. Through these 
two revolutionary experiences, Korea’s labor system came face to face with a 
full-scale challenge—namely, the activation of collective labor-management 
relations and the reform of individual labor-management relations. On the one 
hand, the recognition of unions, institutionalization of collective bargaining 
and frequent incidences of militant strikes became the characterizing feature 
of the industrial relations in Korea.  On the other hand, the recognition of 
employers’ right to dismiss employees, annualized and performance-based 
wage systems, and the practice of signing employment contracts emerged as 
the countermeasures. Consequently, such challenges and countermeasures 
shook the very foundation of the labor system that prevailed in Korea during 
the 70s and 80s.  
The Korean model of the labor market is often said to lack flexibility. But 
such simplification is rather misleading.  I argue that the labor market in 
Korea is divided into a dual structure—one with a high rigidity and the other 
with an excessive flexibility. Though these stereotypical characteristics have 
slightly changed after the economic crisis and IMF relief, they are still 
important characteristics in understanding the structure of the Korean labor 
market.   
What I mean by characterizing the Korea’s labor market as having a dual 
structure is that large enterprises and the public sector have a high level of 
employment stability and low labor turnover on the one hand, SMEs and non-
regular workers experience low employment stability and high labor turnover 
on the other hand. This dual structure is strengthened by labor-management 
relations systems, according to which large enterprises and public 
corporations have large and active unions, which reinforce wages and 
employment stability, while SMEs and non-regular sectors cannot expect 
such protection because either their unions are too weak or they do not have 
a union. Of course, in the background, the employers’ ability to pay high 
wages and the business’s monopolistic position in the market plays an 
important role.  
For the sake of convenience, let us call the large enterprise and public 
corporation sector the “primary labor market sector,” and SMEs and non-
regular work sector including daily wage workers the “secondary labor 
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market sector.”  On the one hand, once employed, the primary sector with an 
elaborate system of internal labor market will provide lifetime employment 
within the corporation and immunity, to a certain extent, against dismissal. 
Due to company-specific human resource development, movement of 
personnel between companies would also be quite difficult. The pay structure 
is seniority-based, and personnel transfers are not easy due to union 
opposition. On the other hand, the secondary labor market is a complete 
competition model, in which recruitments and dismissals occur frequently. 
Payment is given based on the market rate, linked to the type of work, and 
general skills and technology circulated in this market.  
With the advancement of globalization, what faced the greater challenge 
was the primary labor market. Because the large enterprises have 
traditionally played the role of engine for export-oriented economic growth in 
Korea, large enterprises highly depended on the external economy with 
respect to the market and, more recently, for provision of capital.  Thus, the 
necessity for labor market flexibility and raising competitiveness has 
continuously been raised. The greatest difficulties in labor issues faced by 
these enterprises were that dismissing existing employees was difficult 
compared to other countries, and that it was hard to set market wages in the 
process of recruiting and using new employees.  
The difficulty in dismissal is largely attributed to the strong opposition of 
the union or employees. The workers resisted the restructuring attempt 
because they were used to the lifetime employment model, and thus getting 
laid off from a job meant facing a significant socio-economic disadvantage as 
well as facing a labor market where reemployment is very difficult. The issue 
is also linked to the earlier-mentioned difficulty in recruiting and transferring. 
In a situation where workers are not trained based on tasks and the market 
wage is not set, employment opportunities for job-seekers will be limited and 
enterprises will be unable to carry out effective human resource management 
due to a lack of information.  
Going through fundamental changes in the environment surrounding 
industrial relations since ’97, and for a decade since 1987, the enterprise-
based industrial relations failed in adapting to the market as well as in 
achieving of social solidarity.  Thus, we may conclude that the collective 
bargaining model under the enterprise-based labor relations has reached its 
limits. In a situation where both unions and employers of large enterprises are 
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reluctant to move toward industry-wide labor relations right away, in order to 
create a balanced labor relations system that can address the bipolarization 
situation between workers of different sizes of companies and become a 
nation-wide voice replacing the near-extinct trade union movement of SMEs, 
a new emphasis on social concertation model is needed.  
While the “bargaining model” is about forming industrial relations based on 
collective bargaining between labor and management and realizing workers’ 
interest through negotiation, the “concertation model” is about accomplishing 
the interest of workers as a whole through negotiations, by reflecting 
industrial relations in the area of state governance and changing labor-
management relations in a balanced way.  
However, in the case of Korea, the differentiation between the bargaining 
model and the concertation model has been vague since 1987. As the 
bargaining model developed in an unbalanced way, creating a politicized 
bargaining structure encompassing labor-management negotiation as well as 
de facto social bargaining between labor and government, labor-management 
issues easily turned into labor-government issues and wage hikes were 
easily acquired as the spoils of political strikes. In this process, employers, 
who were one of the main stakeholders in the bargaining rounds, were often 
marginalized to the position of a third party by the unions and government, or 
voluntarily rely on the social representation of the government or public 
opinion in response to the union.  
What put the management in such a passive position was the fact that 
labor-management relations did not need to be regulated by general labor 
market conditions as the Korean labor market grew continuously in terms of 
wage and employment.  Moreover, the best way to put an end to politicized 
struggles was to adjust labor-market conditions such as wages and 
employment within the framework of labor-management relations.  
Consequently, labor politics excessively relied on the bargaining model, 
particularly the strike model that was politically mobilized, and workers of 
companies without the power or potential to engage in strike or pay the 
expenses were excluded from the domain of labor politics.  
Since 1997, industrial relations in Korea met a transitional stage, during 
which it had to face the full-fledged strength of the market. The face-off 
resulted in instability and crisis in the labor market, demonstrating the 
fundamental limitation of the existing bargaining model. Formally, the scope 
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of labor politics expanded with the operation of social dialogue organs such 
as the Korean Tripartite Commission and improved representation for 
workers through the election of members of the Democratic Labor Party to 
the National Assembly.  Yet, in terms of contents, the labor movement was 
unable to effectively deal with the main issues of labor-management relations, 
such as bipolarization of the labor market, and aggravation of the lives of 
unorganized workers.  
Though the Korean bargaining model still carries much potential for 
development in terms of industrial bargaining and productivity bargaining, it 
has reached its limits in terms of playing a leading role in industrial relations.  
The limitation stems from various sources such as the union’s adoption of 
isolated movement methods based on the public sector, emergence of 
conferred labor-management relations taking advantage of the bipolarized 
structure, increased complexity in employment issues besides wages, etc. In 
addition, the current challenges that face the working class such as the 
expansion of non-regular jobs, increase of restructuring programs and 
marginalization of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) have resulted in part 
from the lack of organized protection from unions.   The magnitude of the 
challenges has reached a level where they cannot be easily resolved through 
the disproportionately developed bargaining model in enterprise-level labor-
management relations.  
In order to cope with the severe worker instability that stem from open 
economy and market bipolarization, strategies that merely attempt to stabilize 
the bargaining structure for already organized workers and to eliminate 
causes of strikes are insufficient. Through social consultation and a tripartite 
concertation model, we must rationalize the bargaining culture of individual 
workplaces from a practical and productive perspective, and strive to take the 
political bargaining issues related to social reform and economic policy to a 
higher level for consideration. The new model will not only focus on the 
stabilization of labor-management relations in the large enterprises, but also 
embrace the issues of the majority of workers, including those with no union 
representation such as non-regular workers and employees of small and 
medium enterprises.  
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